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Abstract  
This paper documents Finland’s policy response to the increase in asylum applications 
in 2015 and the labor market performance of earlier immigrants living in Finland. 
Immigrants born in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia had substantially lower employment 
rates, earned less and received more social benefits than other immigrant groups or 
natives in 1990–2013. The immigrant-native gaps in employment and earnings 
decreased over time but remained large. Ten years after arriving in Finland, the average 
earnings of immigrant men from these countries were only 22–38 percent of the average 
earnings of native men of the same age. The relative earnings of women were even 
smaller. Furthermore, the difference in equivalence-scaled social benefits persisted over 
time despite the narrowing of earnings gaps. 
Key words: integration, employment, immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers 
JEL classes: J61, J31 
Tiivistelmä  
Tämä artikkeli tarkastelee Suomessa asuvien maahanmuuttajien pärjäämistä 
työmarkkinoilla vuosina 1990–2013, ja esittelee lyhyesti politiikkamuutoksia, joita 
Suomessa tehtiin syksystä 2015 alkaen, kun turvapaikanhakijoiden määrä äkillisesti 
kasvoi. Afganistanissa, Irakissa ja Somaliassa syntyneiden maahanmuuttajien työllisyys 
ja tulot olivat huomattavasti pienemmät kuin muissa maissa syntyneiden 
maahanmuuttajien tai kantaväestön. Erot maahanmuuttajien ja kantaväestön välillä 
pienenevät Suomessa asutun ajan kuluessa, mutta ne pysyvät merkittävinä myös 
pidemmällä aikavälillä. Kymmenen vuotta Suomeen muuttamisen 
jälkeen Afganistanissa, Irakissa ja Somaliassa syntyneiden miesten työtulot olivat  
vain 22–38 prosenttia samanikäisten kantaväestöön kuuluvien miesten työtuloista. 
Naisten kohdalla suhteelliset tuloerot olivat vieläkin suuremmat. Erot ekvivalenssi-
skaalatuissa tulonsiirroissa pysyivät melko vakaina Suomessa asutun ajan kuluessa siitä 
huolimatta, että erot työtuloissa pienenevät.  
Asiasanat: kotoutuminen, työllisyys, maahanmuutto, pakolaiset, turvapaikanhakijat 
JEL-luokat: J61, J31 
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1. Introduction 
Between 2014 and 2015, the number of asylum applications filed in Finland 
increased by 890 percent. While the absolute numbers remained at roughly the 
level of a “normal” year in neighboring Sweden, inflows on this scale had not 
been seen in Finland since World War II. Like everywhere in Europe, stories of 
asylum seekers filled the news and captured the public imagination. A major part 
of the ensuing policy debate concerned the expected labor market performance of 
those who would stay in Finland and the consequent impact on public finances.  
This paper aims to inform the policy debate by documenting how earlier 
immigrants from refugee-sending countries have coped in the Finnish labor 
market in 1990–2013. The results are rather bleak. At the end of their first year in 
Finland, only four percent of men born in Iraq were employed and their average 
earnings were only four percent of the average earnings of native men of the 
same age. This immigrant-native gap decreased over time, but remained large. 
Ten years after arrival, the average earnings of men born in Iraq were still less 
than a quarter of the average earnings of same-age native men. The results for 
men born in Afghanistan and Somalia are similar, except that they experienced 
slightly faster earnings growth than Iraqis. The differences in labor market 
performance between women from these countries and native women were even 
larger than those for men.  
The low earnings of immigrants from refugee-sending countries are partly 
reflected in their social benefits. Immigrants from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia 
receive roughly twice as much in (equivalence-scaled) benefits as natives. 
However, despite an increase in earnings over time in Finland, benefits tend to 
remain quite constant. In fact, earnings and benefits increase at the same time 
among some immigrant groups. These patterns highlight the complexity of the 
Finnish benefits system and the importance of examining both labor market 
performance and benefits when assessing the fiscal effect of immigration.  
An unfortunate limitation of my analysis is that Statistics Finland does not 
currently hold information on the residence permit status of immigrants. While 
the majority of immigrants from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia are likely to be 
refugees (or family-reunified members of refugees), country of birth is unlikely 
to be a good approximation for residence status for immigrants from other origin 
regions. For example, while almost one thousand Russians obtained asylum in 
Finland between 2000 and 2015, they and their families represent only a small 
fraction of the roughly 80,000 Russian immigrants living in Finland in 2015.1  
                                              
1 The number of asylums is from the Finnish Immigration Service and the number of Russian immigrants 
is from Statistics Finland. The latter is defined as persons whose “background country” is either Russia or 
the Soviet Union. 
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This paper adds to the large literature examining the labor market integration of 
immigrants (see Borjas 1999 and Kerr and Kerr 2011 for reviews). Sarvimäki 
(2011) documents the integration of immigrants arriving in the 1990s in the 
Finnish labor markets.  Previous work examining other Nordic countries includes 
Edin et al. (2000), Barth et al. (2004), Nielsen et al. (2004), and papers in this 
volume. Salminen (2015) presents a detailed comparison of the social benefits 
and the use of public services among immigrants living in Finland by country of 
birth. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next two sections provide a 
brief history of the pattern of refugees in Finland and an overview of the policy 
responses to the rapid increase in asylum seekers in 2015. Section 4 presents the 
data and Sections 5 and 6 the results. The final section concludes. 
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2. Refugees in Finland 
Finland has a long, if often forgotten, history as a destination for refugees.2 After 
gaining independence in the midst of the Russian Revolution, Finland became a 
natural first destination for those fleeing the revolution from northwest Russia. 
According to official statistics, roughly 20,000 refugees from Russia were living 
in Finland in 1922. However, this number is likely to be an underestimate due to 
incomplete registration.  
During World War II, the numbers increased dramatically as 430,000 persons (11 
percent of the Finnish population) were internally displaced from areas ceded to 
the Soviet Union. In addition, 63,000 Ingrian Finns were moved to Finland 
during the war. These two groups faced very different policies. The displaced 
population was resettled in the remaining parts of Finland and gained 
compensation for their lost property (see e.g. Pihkala 1952 for discussion). This 
resettlement policy is widely considered a success. Waris et al. (1952) argue that 
the social integration of the displaced population was well underway already in 
the late 1940s, and Sarvimäki et al. (2016) show that the displaced population 
fared remarkably well in the post-war labor market. 
In contrast, Ingrian Finns were returned to the Soviet Union at the end of the war. 
This marked a new era in Finland’s refugee policy. All kinds of immigration 
were tightly restricted and virtually no one was granted asylum. A tentative 
opening was made with the arrival of 180 Chilean refugees in 1973–1978. A 
more organized refugee policy began in 1979 with the admission of the first 
Vietnamese refugees. However, numbers remained very limited throughout the 
1980s.  
The number of individuals seeking international protection from Finland 
increased in the early 1990s, and Finland granted asylum to about 5,000 
individuals between 1990 and 1994. Most of these were fleeing the civil wars in 
disintegrating Yugoslavia and Somalia. By the end of the 1990s, roughly 18,000 
refugees and their family members were living in Finland. In addition, Ingrian 
Finns and their descendants were granted return migrant status in the early 1990s 
and roughly 30,000 Ingrian Finns moved to Finland during the next two decades. 
 
  
                                              
2 The numbers quoted in this section are from Martikainen et al. (2013), and from the websites of the 
Finnish Immigration Service and Statistics Finland (visited in September 2016). 
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Figure 1. Asylum applications and positive decisions on international 
protection, 1990–2015 
 
Data source: Finnish Immigration Service. 
As shown in Figure 1, the number of annual asylum applications ranged between 
1,500 and 6,000 and positive decisions between 500 and 1,800 in the period from 
1990 to 2014. These inflows represented a relatively small share of overall 
immigration. During this period, the total immigrant population grew almost 
ninefold from 37,000 to 320,000 persons (or from 0.8 to 5.9 percent of the 
population). 
Figure 2 presents the top10 source countries of refugees and asylum seekers in 
2000–2014. For each source country, the top bars plot the number of asylum 
applications and the bottom bars the number of positive decisions (including 
quota refugees). Three countries – Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan – correspond to 
60 percent of positive decisions and 30 percent of applications. Citizens of 
Russia and the former Yugoslavia also filed a relatively large number of 
applications, but most of these were declined. Furthermore, there were only 804 
applications from Syrians, almost all of them made in 2011–2014. 
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Figure 2.  Asylum applications and positive decisions on international 
protection, by country, 2000–2014 
 
Data source: Finnish Immigration Service. 
 
Little of the developments discussed above can be seen from Figure 1, however, 
because the scale of the vertical axis is so dominated by the last observation in 
the time-series for asylum applications. In 2015, Finland received 32,476 
applications – a large proportion of which are still being processed by the 
Immigration Service. In comparison, there were 5,988 applications in the 
previous record year in 2009, and an average of 2,700 applications during the 
1990–2014 period. 
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Figure 3.  Asylum applications by country, 2015 
 
Data source: Finnish Immigration Service. 
 
Figure 3 presents 2015 asylum applications by origin country. The top three 
countries are the same as in figure 2, but almost two thirds of the applications 
were filed by Iraqis . While there are more applications from Syrians than during 
the previous 15 years combined, they correspond to less than three percent of all 
applicants. 
20,485 
5,214 
1,981 
877 
762 
619 
2,538 
Iraq 
Afghanistan 
Somalia 
Syria 
Albania 
Iran 
Other 
7 
 
3. Policy responses to the 2015 increase in asylum 
seekers 
The Finnish government responded to the rapid increase in asylum seekers in 
three ways. First, it had to cope with the situation at hand. Between August and 
December 2015, the number of reception centers increased from 22 to 144 and 
the number of workers at the Immigration Service from 365 to 508.3 
Furthermore, the asylum application process was accelerated by increasing 
automation and reducing the duration of asylum interviews. 
The second response was to make Finland a less attractive destination. For 
instance, the Immigration Service published a press release on May 16, 2016 
entitled “Humanitarian protection no longer granted; new guidelines issued for 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia”. The content was arguably less dramatic than the 
title. Humanitarian protection referred to one type of residence permit that had 
now been repealed, while asylum seekers could still gain residence through the 
asylum procedure or on the basis of subsidiary protection.4 Nevertheless, 
removing this residence permit category clearly tightened asylum policy. 
Furthermore, the press release stated that the security situation had improved in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia and that the Immigration Service had updated its 
country guidelines accordingly.  
Other forms of reducing “pull factors” included restrictions in family 
reunification and reductions in social benefits. According to the new rules, 
recently admitted refugees can apply for family reunification only if they have 
sufficient income. For instance, a person wishing to bring a spouse and two 
children to Finland would need to have a net market income of at least 2,600 
euros per month. However, this income requirement does not apply to families 
formed before the refugee arrived in Finland, if the refugee applies for family 
reunification within three months of obtaining asylum.5  
The third policy response was to rethink integration policies. The government 
published an action plan on May 2016 on the overhaul of integration services.6 
The plan included measures to streamline the inception of integration services; to 
improve recognition of education obtained abroad; to integrate language studies 
into other studies and so forth. In addition, a new type of public-private initiative 
                                              
3 The figures are from the 2015 annual report of the Finnish Immigration Service.  
4 Before May 16, 2016, residence permits could be granted on the basis of humanitarian protection when 
the applicant did not meet the requirements for asylum, but could not return to her home country because 
of a poor security situation or an environmental disaster. 
5 Those who have been granted international protection on other grounds always have to fulfil the income 
requirement. 
6 See dlvr.it/LCph5k for a press release on the action plan and https://t.co/ZaOySX8xGG for a press 
release on the SIB-based integration programs. 
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was launched. This program combines short language training with a quick 
pathway to employment and further on-the-job language training. Another 
novelty of the new program is that it is funded by private capital and investors 
are compensated based on the unemployment benefits received and taxes paid by 
the participants (in comparison to a control group participating in other types of 
integration programs). More precisely, the impact evaluation is conducted as an 
RCT, where the Ministry of Employment and Economy invites randomly 
selected refugees to participate in the new program.  
 
4. Data 
Statistics Finland created my data by combining information from several 
administrative registers. These data contain annual information on country of 
birth, mother tongue, nationality, family structure, employment and income for 
the entire working age population living in Finland in 1988–2013. I focus on 25–
60 year old individuals who immigrated at age 18 or older.7 
A limitation of these data is that they contain no information on the type of 
residence permit. Thus I have to approximate refugee status based on the country 
of birth. This approximation is clearly problematic for origin areas such as the 
former Soviet Union and Turkey. While some immigrants from these countries 
moved to Finland due to a need for international protection, most came for other 
reasons. On the other hand, the vast majority of those coming from Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Somalia are likely to have entered Finland for international protection or 
as family members of those granted asylum. Furthermore, Finland had no history 
of labor migration from the former Yugoslavia – or from virtually anywhere 
prior to the early 1990s. Thus the share of refugees among those born in the 
former Yugoslavia is likely to be higher in Finland than in the other Nordic 
countries.  
Table 1 reports basic background characteristics for eight groups of immigrants 
and natives. In comparison to natives, immigrants from most origin areas tend to 
be younger, more often male, more often married and to have more children. The 
differences are particularly pronounced among those coming from Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Somalia, whereas immigrants from the former Soviet Union and the 
OECD area are more similar to natives along these dimensions. 
  
                                              
7 For computational reasons, the results reported in Tables 2–5 and A1 use data containing the full 
population of immigrants and a 10% random sample of natives. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
  Region of origin    
  Iraq Afghanistan Somalia
former 
Yugoslavia 
former 
Soviet 
Union Turkey OECD Other  Natives 
Age 37.8 38.3 37.1 38.6 40.9 35.6 36.9 37.2  42.7 
Age at arrival 31.3 33.5 29.0 30.9 33.9 28.4 31.6 31.5  . 
Female 0.38 0.49 0.46 0.43 0.65 0.20 0.33 0.49  0.49 
Number of 
children 2.1 1.9 3.4 1.8 0.9 1.4 1.0 1.1  1.0 
Marital status                    
Single 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.41 0.27  0.31 
Married 0.69 0.74 0.67 0.78 0.70 0.69 0.50 0.59  0.55 
Divorced 0.10 0.06 0.17 0.08 0.17 0.18 0.09 0.14  0.12 
Widow 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.02 
Year of arrival                    
1990-1994 0.13 0.01 0.31 0.28 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.14  . 
1995-1999 0.24 0.05 0.15 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.11  . 
2000-2004 0.19 0.48 0.11 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.20  . 
2005-2009 0.44 0.47 0.43 0.25 0.35 0.44 0.42 0.54  . 
Years to first job 4.5 4.2 5.6 4.1 3.0 2.3 1.0 2.0  . 
Emigrates during 
the first 10 years 0.10 0.07 0.19 0.12 0.16 0.08 0.22 0.11    
Observations 44,146 12,350 51,211 64,359 453,710 44,532 208,507 641,116  58,888,641 
Individuals 5,184 1,863 5,027 5,661 45,797 4,698 32,635 100,038  3,920,391 
Note: Averages from population level data on 25–60 year old immigrants who immigrated at age 18 or older and natives in years 1990–2013. Data 
source: see section 4.
10 
 
5. Employment 
The top panels of Figure 4 present employment rates for the eight immigrant 
groups and natives in 1990–2013. Employment is defined either as holding a job 
at the end of the year (panel A) or having any wage, salary or entrepreneurial 
income (panel B). The latter definition yields higher employment rates, but the 
patterns across immigrant groups and over time are very similar for both 
measures. Thus for the rest of this paper I focus on employment at the end of the 
year. 
Figure 4 shows a large variation in employment rates across immigrant groups. 
While immigrants had a lower employment rate than natives throughout the 
1990–2013 period, the immigrant-native gap decreased substantially over time. 
Another notable pattern is that in the 1990s there were large differences in the 
employment rates of immigrants from the OECD countries, the former Soviet 
Union, former Yugoslavia, Turkey and the group “others”. By 2013, however, 
these differences had largely disappeared and the employment rates of all these 
groups had stabilized at 52–58 percent. In contrast, the employment rates of 
immigrants from Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia moved roughly together and 
remained modest at 20–26 percent in 2013.  
A limitation of time-series such as those reported in Figure 4 is that they mix 
together employment dynamics attributable to the integration process and 
changes in the composition of the immigrant population. The first part of the 
composition effect is due to the fact that it typically takes immigrants some time 
to find employment after arriving in the host country. Thus employment rates 
may differ between immigrant groups simply because one group has a larger 
share of recent arrivals. 
Figure 5 illustrates the issue by separately plotting the employment rates for four 
arrival cohorts. It shows that, within each origin region, those who arrived earlier 
tend to work more than those who arrived more recently. The employment of 
each arrival cohort also increased faster than the employment of the entire 
immigrant population from the same origin region. Furthermore, Figure 5 
illustrates heterogeneity between immigrants from the same origin areas arriving 
in different years. For example, immigrants from Iraq and Somalia arriving in the 
early 2000s have had a higher employment rate from 2008 onwards than their 
compatriots who arrived in the late 1990s.   
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Figure 4.  Employment rates, average earnings and average equivalence 
scaled benefits by country of origin, 1990–2013
 
Note: This figure presents time-series for (a) employment rate at the end of the year, (b) share of 
individuals who have any earnings during a year, (c) average annual earnings (including zeros), 
and (d) average equivalence-scaled income transfers for 25–60 year old individuals who 
immigrated at age 18 or older. Earnings and benefits converted to 2010 euros using Statistics 
Finland’s consumer price index. Data source: see section 4. 
 
The second key component of the composition effect is that as immigrants spend 
more time in the host country, they also grow older. Thus the patterns presented 
in Figure 5 mix together improvements in employment due to accumulating 
country-specific experience and improvements due to accumulating experience 
more generally. A large literature has attempted to isolate these two sources of 
improved labor market performance from each other by comparing the 
employment and earnings dynamics of immigrants to those of observationally 
identical natives (see e.g. Borjas, 1999, and Kerr and Kerr, 2011, for reviews).  
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Figure 5.  Employment rate by country of origin and arrival cohort 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure presents time-series for employment rate at the end of the year by region of 
origin in 1990–2013 for 25–60 year old individuals who immigrated at age 18 or older. Data 
source: see section 4. 
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Table 2. Differences in employment rates over time lived in Finland 
  Men  Women 
  1 5 10 15  1 5 10 15 
Iraq -0.69 -0.53 -0.48 -0.50  -0.74 -0.68 -0.64 -0.63 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Afghanistan -0.69 -0.44 -0.37 .  -0.77 -0.69 -0.58 . 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)   (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)  
Somalia -0.69 -0.55 -0.48 -0.48  -0.72 -0.68 -0.68 -0.66 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Yugoslavia -0.43 -0.33 -0.27 -0.18  -0.61 -0.55 -0.47 -0.37 
(former) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Soviet Union -0.30 -0.20 -0.15 -0.12  -0.52 -0.35 -0.22 -0.17 
(former) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Turkey -0.25 -0.15 -0.17 -0.17  -0.63 -0.60 -0.54 -0.53 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
OECD -0.19 -0.20 -0.14 -0.11  -0.31 -0.31 -0.26 -0.22 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Other -0.20 -0.23 -0.22 -0.20  -0.38 -0.31 -0.24 -0.19 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
All  -0.26 -0.24 -0.22 -0.20  -0.45 -0.36 -0.28 -0.23 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: This table reports immigrant-native employment gaps after conditioning on gender, age, 
calendar year and time lived in Finland. The estimates are constructed as 
ݕ௬௦௠௚ ൌ ∑ߠ௚ሺݕݏ݉, ݐ, ܆ሻሾ݁௚ሺݕݏ݉, ݐ, ܆ሻ െ ݁௡ሺݐ, ܆ሻሿ, where ݁௚ሺݕݏ݉, ݐ, ܆ሻ	is the employment 
rate of immigrants from source area g at the end of year t who have background characteristics 
X (age and gender) and have lived in Finland for ysm years; ݁௡ሺݐ, ܆ሻ is the employment rate of 
natives with the same background characteristics X in the same year t, and the weights 
ߠ௚ሺݕݏ݉, ݐ, ܆ሻ ൌ ܰ௚ሺݕݏ݉, ݐ, ܆ሻ/ܰ௚ሺݕݏ݉ሻ are the share of immigrants from source area g in 
year t with characteristics X out of all immigrants from this source area observed in their ysmth 
year in Finland. Bootstrapped standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated using 100 
replications using data for a random sample of 10% of natives and the full population of 
immigrants. Data source: see section 4. 
 
Table 2 reports employment rate gaps between immigrants and natives over time 
lived in Finland. I constructed these estimates by comparing the employment 
rates of immigrants to the employment rate of natives of the same age and gender 
during the same calendar year (see the note to table 2 for details). The first entry, 
at the top-left, shows that during their first full calendar year in Finland, men 
from Iraq had a 70 percentage point lower employment rate than native men of 
the same age. Over time, their employment grew faster than that of natives, but 
even after ten years in Finland, the employment gap was 48 percentage points. 
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The corresponding figures for men from Somalia were almost identical at 68 
percentage points in the first year and 48 percentage points ten years after arrival, 
respectively. Afghani men started with a similarly large initial gap, but 
experienced somewhat faster employment growth. Nevertheless, at the end of 
their tenth year in Finland, their employment rate was 37 percentage points lower 
than that of same-age native men. 
The remainder of table 2 reports similar measures for the other immigrant 
groups. There are three notable patterns. Men from OECD countries had the 
highest relative employment rates, but even for them the employment gap 
remained at 14 percentage points a decade after moving to Finland. The relative 
employment rates of women were lower than those of men for all groups. 
Finally, immigrants’ employment rates tended to approach the employment rates 
of natives during the first ten years in Finland, but the gaps remained roughly 
constant after that.  
The third potential source of composition effects is due to selective outmigration 
(see Dustmann and Görlach, 2015, for discussion). During their first ten years in 
Finland, 15 percent of immigrants leave Finland (see Table 1). If those with 
particularly low employment prospects were more likely to emigrate than those 
with better chances of finding employment, the immigrant-native gap would 
decrease simply due to changes in the average characteristics of the remaining 
immigrant population. Conversely, if those with the highest employment rates 
were more likely to leave, the composition changes would mask part of the labor 
market integration among those staying. Appendix table A1 examines this issue 
by reproducing table 2 using data only for those who stay in Finland for at least 
10 years. While the immigrant-native gaps tend to be slightly narrower for 
immigrants who stayed longer, these differences are small and do not affect any 
of my conclusions. Thus I include all immigrants in the rest of the analysis 
regardless of whether they end up staying or leaving Finland.  
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6. Earnings 
I next repeat the analysis above, but now using annual earnings as an outcome 
variable. This provides a more comprehensive view of labor market integration 
than employment rates, because annual earnings capture both wages and the 
hours worked during a year. I measure earnings as the sum of total wages, salary 
and entrepreneurial income and include individuals with zero earnings in the 
analysis. All monetary measures are converted to 2010 euros using Statistics 
Finland’s consumer price index. 
Panel C of figure 4 presents a largely similar picture as panels A and B. All 
immigrant groups have lower average earnings than natives and those from 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia fare particularly badly. However, in contrast to the 
employment rates, immigrants from OECD countries have substantially higher 
average earnings than other immigrant groups. That is, immigrants from OECD 
countries either work more hours or have higher wages (or both).  
Figure 6 and table 5 document earnings growth over time lived in Finland. 
Again, the results closely mirror those for employment. During their first full 
calendar year in Finland, Iraqi men earned only four percent of what comparable 
natives did. Over time, their earnings grew faster than the earnings of natives, but 
even after ten years in Finland, the average earnings of Iraqi men were less than a 
quarter of the average earnings of native men of the same age. The relative 
earnings of immigrants from Afghanistan and Somalia grew somewhat faster. 
Ten years after arrival the average earnings of Afghani men were 38 percent and 
the average earnings of Somali men 28 percent of the earnings of same-age 
native men. 
Other patterns are also qualitatively similar to those for employment. As noted 
above, the most important difference is that the earnings of men from OECD 
countries substantially differed from the earnings of other non-refugee immigrant 
groups despite these groups having had roughly similar employment rates. 
Again, the relative earnings of women were lower than those of men for all 
groups and immigrants’ earnings approached the earnings of natives during the 
first decade after arrival. However, the gaps remained large even after living in 
Finland for more than a decade. 
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Figure 6.  Average annual earnings by country of origin and arrival cohort 
 
 
 
Note: This figure presents time-series for average annual earnings by region of origin in 1990–
2013 for 25–60 year old individuals who immigrated at age 18 or older. Data source: see section 
4. 
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Table 3.  Relative annual earnings over time lived in Finland 
  Men  Women 
  1 5 10 15  1 5 10 15 
Iraq 0.04 0.15 0.22 0.21  0.01 0.07 0.13 0.15 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Afghanistan 0.04 0.25 0.38 .  0.01 0.06 0.23 . 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)    (0.00) (0.01) (0.03)   
Somalia 0.04 0.17 0.29 0.31  0.01 0.06 0.09 0.12 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Yugoslavia 0.26 0.43 0.48 0.51  0.10 0.18 0.29 0.39 
(former) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Soviet Union 0.45 0.60 0.69 0.70  0.21 0.40 0.57 0.67 
(former) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Turkey 0.34 0.48 0.44 0.46  0.11 0.14 0.22 0.25 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
OECD 0.81 0.78 0.87 0.88  0.58 0.57 0.63 0.70 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Other 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.57  0.37 0.47 0.55 0.60 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
All  0.52 0.57 0.60 0.60  0.31 0.41 0.52 0.59 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Note: This table reports average relative earnings of immigrants in comparison to natives of the 
same age and gender. The estimates are constructed as ݕ௬௦௠௚ ൌ ∑ߠ௚ሺݕݏ݉, ݐ, ܆ሻሾݓ௚ሺݕݏ݉, ݐ, ܆ሻ/
ݓ௡ሺݐ, ܆ሻሿ, where ݓ௚ሺݕݏ݉, ݐ, ܆ሻ	is the average earnings of immigrants from source area g in 
year t who have background characteristics X (age and gender) and have lived in Finland for 
ysm years; ݓ௡ሺݐ, ܆ሻ is the average earnings of natives with the same background characteristics 
X in the same year t, and the weights ߠ௚ሺݕݏ݉, ݐ, ܆ሻ ൌ ܰ௚ሺݕݏ݉, ݐ, ܆ሻ/ܰ௚ሺݕݏ݉ሻ are the share 
of immigrants from source area g in year t with characteristics x out of all immigrants from this 
source area observed in their ysmth year in Finland. Bootstrapped standard errors (in 
parentheses) are calculated using 100 replications using data for a random sample of 10% of 
natives and the full population of immigrants. Data source: see section 4. 
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7. Benefits 
I now turn to documenting differences in the use of social benefits. I measure 
benefits as the equivalence-scaled sum of all income transfers received by the 
immigrant and her family members during a calendar year.8 I take this 
measurement approach because two important benefits – housing allowance and 
social assistance – are targeted at households rather than individuals. In 
comparison to the measurement of earnings, another difference is that the data 
include information on benefits only for the years 1995–2013. Thus it is 
important to bear in mind that the results are not directly comparable to those 
reported in the previous section.  
Panel D, figure 4, reports time-series for average annual benefits for the eight 
immigrant groups and for natives. Average benefits were highest for immigrants 
from Afghanistan and Iraq, and lowest for immigrants from the OECD countries. 
These patterns are, of course, exactly what one would expect given the 
differences in average earnings. However, the better labor market performance of 
natives was not fully reflected in their benefits. That is, native households 
collected more benefits, on average, than immigrants from the OECD countries 
and immigrants from “other” countries despite their higher average earnings. The 
most likely reason is that the natives are older and more often entitled to benefits 
determined by earlier earnings. 
Figure 7 reports average benefits by arrival cohorts. The patterns for those 
arriving from the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union in the 1990s mirror those 
for their earnings (see Figure 6). That is, their average earnings increased and 
benefits decreased over time. However, the average benefits received by other 
arrival cohorts or immigrants from other countries remained stable or even 
increased despite the increases in their average earnings.  
Table 4 shows that immigrants’ average benefits were rather stable over time 
lived in Finland, also in comparison to the average benefits of natives of the same 
age. The average equivalence-scaled benefits of households from Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Somalia remained at about twice the level of the benefits of 
natives. The relative average benefits of households of men from OECD 
countries increased during the first five years in Finland and remained constant at 
about three quarters of the level of native households thereafter. Only immigrants 
from the former Soviet Union experienced a steady decrease in their relative 
benefits over time in Finland. However, even for them, the increase in relative 
earnings was much steeper than the decrease in relative benefits. 
                                              
8 I use an equivalence scale which assigns a value of 1 to the first household member, 0.7 to other 
household members aged 15 or older, and 0.5 to each child under 15. I divide the sum of all benefits paid 
to household members in a given year with this scale and assign each member the same equivalence-
scaled benefits. 
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Figure 7.  Average equivalence-scaled annual benefits by country of origin and 
arrival cohort 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure presents time-series for equivalence-scaled annual benefits received by 
immigrant and his/her household for 25–60 year old individuals who immigrated at age 18 or 
older. Data source: see section 4. 
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Table 4. Relative annual equivalence scaled benefits over time lived in Finland 
  Men  Women 
  1 5 10 15  1 5 10 15 
Iraq 2.12 2.40 2.18 2.11  2.31 2.64 2.48 2.40 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Afghanistan 2.21 2.26 1.94 .  2.40 2.88 2.32 . 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)    (0.03) (0.04) (0.07)   
Somalia 2.10 1.96 1.93 1.72  2.15 2.38 2.28 2.03 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Yugoslavia 1.40 1.78 1.67 1.42  1.72 2.15 1.95 1.76 
(former) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Soviet Union 1.22 1.10 1.01 0.95  1.59 1.46 1.36 1.24 
(former) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Turkey 1.09 1.07 1.20 1.24  1.33 1.58 1.63 1.61 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08)
OECD 0.65 0.73 0.75 0.71  0.63 0.77 0.85 0.93 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Other 0.81 1.02 1.13 1.14  1.06 1.23 1.24 1.24 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
All  0.95 1.10 1.16 1.14  1.25 1.39 1.39 1.32 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Note: This table reports average relative benefits of immigrants in comparison to natives of the 
same age and gender (see note for Table 3 for details). Bootstrapped standard errors (in 
parentheses) are calculated using 100 replications using data for a random sample of 10% of 
natives and the full population of immigrants. Data source: see section 4. 
 
The differences in the evolution of relative earnings and benefits are likely to 
reflect the  complexity of the benefit system. Benefits are a function of 
household composition, the earnings of all members of the household (for some, 
but not all benefits), housing costs and so forth. Furthermore, higher earnings do 
not typically lead to a one-to-one reduction in benefits even in the case of single-
person households. The patterns documented above highlight the importance of 
both labor market integration and the details of the tax and benefit systems for 
the fiscal impacts of immigration. However, a full investigation of the interaction 
between earnings and benefits is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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8. Conclusions 
This paper presented an overview of Finland’s policy response to the increase in 
asylum applications in 2015 and documented the employment, earnings and 
benefits of earlier immigrant cohorts. The two topics are closely related as the 
policy responses following the 2015 inflows were largely motivated by the 
perception that earlier refugees had not integrated well into the Finnish labor 
market and thus constituted a burden on public finances.  
The results reported in this paper are largely in line with this view. I find that 
earlier cohorts of immigrants from the main source countries of the 2015 asylum 
seekers – Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia – had substantially lower employment 
rates and average earnings and collected more social benefits than natives. While 
the immigrant-native gap decreased over the first decade lived in Finland, it 
remained substantial. Furthermore, the differences in benefits remained roughly 
constant despite the increase in immigrants’ employment rates and earnings.  
Of course, asylum seekers arriving in 2015 may differ from earlier cohorts from 
the same countries. Furthermore, the new approaches in integration policies that 
Finland is currently adopting may be more efficient than previous policies. 
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to expect that also the newly arrived asylum 
seekers will face challenges in establishing themselves in the Finnish labor 
market.   
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Table A1. Differences in employment rates over time lived in Finland, all 
immigrants vs. “stayers” 
    Men   Women 
    1 5 10 15   1 5 10 15 
Iraq All -0.71 -0.59 -0.48 -0.50   -0.69 -0.66 -0.65 -0.63 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
  Stayers -0.71 -0.58 -0.47 -0.49   -0.69 -0.66 -0.64 -0.63 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Afghanistan All -0.72 -0.47 -0.38 .   -0.74 -0.66 -0.57 . 
    (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)     (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)   
  Stayers -0.73 -0.45 -0.36 .   -0.74 -0.66 -0.57 . 
    (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)     (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)   
Somalia All -0.65 -0.57 -0.48 -0.48   -0.66 -0.66 -0.68 -0.66 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)   (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
  Stayers -0.66 -0.56 -0.45 -0.44   -0.67 -0.66 -0.67 -0.64 
    (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Yugoslavia All -0.58 -0.41 -0.27 -0.18   -0.64 -0.58 -0.47 -0.37 
(former)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
  Stayers -0.57 -0.38 -0.25 -0.15   -0.65 -0.58 -0.46 -0.34 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Soviet All -0.38 -0.21 -0.15 -0.12   -0.55 -0.37 -0.22 -0.17 
Union   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
(former) Stayers -0.40 -0.17 -0.13 -0.12   -0.56 -0.36 -0.21 -0.16 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Turkey All -0.30 -0.20 -0.17 -0.17   -0.61 -0.58 -0.56 -0.53 
    (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
  Stayers -0.28 -0.17 -0.15 -0.16   -0.63 -0.59 -0.55 -0.51 
    (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)   (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
OECD All -0.18 -0.19 -0.14 -0.11   -0.31 -0.32 -0.26 -0.22 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
  Stayers -0.12 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09   -0.25 -0.24 -0.22 -0.19 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Other All -0.32 -0.28 -0.22 -0.20   -0.45 -0.34 -0.24 -0.19 
    (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
  Stayers -0.33 -0.23 -0.19 -0.18   -0.46 -0.32 -0.22 -0.18 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Everyone All -0.34 -0.28 -0.22 -0.20   -0.50 -0.39 -0.28 -0.23 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
  Stayers -0.36 -0.23 -0.19 -0.18   -0.52 -0.37 -0.26 -0.22 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: This table reports immigrant-native employment gaps (see the note to Table 2 for details). In each panel, the top entry 
reports results using data for all immigrants who arrived to Finland in 1990–2002; the bottom entry reports the estimates for 
immigrants who stayed in Finland for at least ten years. Data source: see section 4. 
 
